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Why do states agree to admit refugees into their country? On August 7th, 1953, U.S. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower said in his signing of the 1953 Refugee Relief Act that “in enacting this 
legislation, we are giving a new chance in life to 214,000 fellow humans. This action demonstrates 
again America's traditional concern for the homeless, the persecuted and the less fortunate of other 
lands. It is a dramatic contrast to the tragic events taking place in East Germany and in other captive 
nations” (American Presidency Project).4 President Eisenhower was contrasting the United States’ 
humanitarianism with the Soviet Union’s mistreatment of its citizens, as well as citizens in 
countries that the Soviets controlled.  
In recent years, the war-ravaged countries of Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria, among 
others, have produced an unprecedented number of refugees seeking admission into countries 
throughout the world. The response of the countries to which these refugees have appealed for 
refugee status has varied widely, with some countries being much more willing than others to grant 
refugee status (UNHCR 2017). Scholars studying the role of interstate politics in decisions to grant 
refugee status have suggested that states that share an adversarial relationship are more likely to 
accept each other’s refugees than those that do not (Teitelbaum 1984, Weiner 1992, Loescher 
1994). Although this theoretical argument has been around for over 30 years, it has only been 
subjected to limited empirical scrutiny.  
We provide one of the first attempts to empirically test these arguments. Further, we argue 
that it is not merely the presence of severe antagonism, or interstate rivalry, which leads states to 
admit refugees who are fleeing an adversarial regime. We argue and provide evidence to show that 
the specific issue being disputed is what drives states to decide to admit refugees from their 
 
4 All replication materials available at 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2F2RUYRK 
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opponent into their country. When refugees flee a state locked into an ideological rivalry, that 
state’s opponent, who has likely been asserting its own ideological and/or moral superiority over 
its opponent, is now incentivized to admit the refugees in order to uphold the legitimacy of their 
claim. For example, the United States could not continue to tell the world that it was a regime of 
humanitarianism and that the U.S.S.R. was a regime of oppression while at the same refusing to 
extend a humanitarian hand to the victims of the Soviets. Key to our argument are the costs of 
refusing refugee admission by ideological rivals: while any state takes on costs when it chooses to 
accept refugees, and most states therefore do not host them, ideological rivalry reduces the net 
costs of refugee admission by providing a unique incentive to accept the refugees. In other words, 
for ideological rivals, taking in refugees allows the state to bolster its claim of superiority over its 
rival.  
Our research has direct implications for a difficult policy question: how can the 
international community convince more states to host refugees, rather than leaving the burden on 
relatively few states? Refugee protection is a public good, and policymakers have struggled to 
overcome the free rider problem of convincing states to voluntarily take in refugees (Betts 2009). 
The UNHCR offers some financial support to states hosting refugees in an attempt to offset the 
economic costs of hosting refugees, but usually not enough to cover the entirety of the costs, 
especially when the refugees remain in the host countries permanently or for many years, and the 
economic assistance does not help to offset costs associated with domestic pressures such as rapid 
changes in demographics or public opposition to hosting refugees. Selective incentives are needed 
to convince countries to voluntarily host refugees. Some states, such as Sweden, use their 
permissive refugee admission policy to enhance their international reputation, amounting to a 
selective incentive which incentivizes them to take in refugees (Bevelander, Hagstrom, and 
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Ronnqvist 2009). We propose that ideological rivalry should be viewed as conducive to another 
type of selective incentive. By taking in refugees from an ideological rival, a host sends a signal 
to its own population, as well as the international community, that its system of government or 
cultural climate is indeed superior, supporting its claim in the ideological dispute. IGOs and 
INGOs concerned with refugee protection should focus their limited resources on pressuring the 
sending state’s enemy to take in the refugees. 
Interstate Politics and Refugees 
The existing scholarship on international relations and refugee flows has largely focused on the 
strategic calculus of refugees, finding that refugees are more likely to go to places where they are 
safe and have economic opportunities or where they face little risk of further violence (Ober and 
Melander 2003; Davenport et. al. 2003; Shellman and Moore 2004; Moore and Shellman 2006, 
2007). This means that while asylum-seekers are fleeing their homes due to circumstances beyond 
their control, they are still making conscious decisions about which states to seek refuge in, mostly 
from a choice set defined by contiguity. Refugees tend to settle in contiguous states, but among 
the set of states that border the asylum-seekers’ home state, refugees make a cost-benefit 
calculation and travel to a state where they will be relatively safe. In this paper, we look at the 
opposite side of the refugee equation. More specifically, we attempt to understand the interstate 
factors that drive a state’s decision to grant refugee status to those seeking refuge within its borders. 
Scholars have generally argued that the costs of admitting refugees are higher than the 
benefits, and these costs come from a number of mechanisms. If the refugees are fleeing armed 
conflicts, they may have connections to armed rebel groups. This could provide them access to 
weapons and resources that could spread the conflict within the receiving state’s borders, leading 
to an increased chance of terrorism and civil war (Loescher 1992; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; 
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Choi and Salehyan 2013).  Refugees also increase the likelihood that the receiving state will be 
involved in an international conflict, as they are likely to be seen as a threat to the state of origin 
even after they have left, or the refugees’ home country may pursue them across international 
boundaries (Salehyan 2008).  
Aside from the security risks of admitting refugees, Domestic political costs for the host 
can also be steep, contributing to the high costs of accepting refugees. In some cases, taking in 
refugees will be unpopular with the general population. This lack of domestic popularity often 
stems from factors beyond simply xenophobia, as refugees will place a strain upon the state’s 
welfare system, at least into the near future (McCarty 2013). Even if refugees are allowed to work 
in the host state, they may introduce new, sudden competition for low-wage laborers (Collier 
2013).  
In light of the high costs attached to refugee admission, scholars who have studied the role 
of interstate politics in refugee flows have previously suggested that adversarial states are more 
likely to take in their opponent’s refugees than those coming from states that are not adversaries. 
In cases where an adversarial relationship between the receiving and send state is not present, there 
will not be offsetting benefits at the interstate level to make up for the costs paid domestically 
(Loescher 1986; Salehyan and Rosenblum 2008).  These scholars have suggested that states can 
use refugee admissions as means of discrediting and de-legitimating an adversary’s regime. More 
specifically, the state can use the public nature of refugee flows to highlight their adversary’s poor 
treatment of their own citizens and highlight the failures of its regime (Loescher 1994; Newland 
1995; Teitelbaum 1984; Weiner 1992; Zolberg 1995).  
The previous literature, while providing scholars with a solid foundation to move forward, 
can be improved upon by incorporating insights and theorization from the rivalry research agenda. 
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Rivalries are “relationships in which states have singled out other states as distinctive competitors 
and enemies posing some actual or potential military threat” (Colaresi et al. 2009). Essentially, 
states that are rivals share a strong adversarial relationship due to a disagreement over a contentious 
issue(s) that has endured over an extended period of time (Colaresi et al. 2008; Diehl and Goertz 
2000; Vasquez 2009). Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) provide a quantitative evaluation of the 
nature of rivalry and the average number of refugees admitted into a country, but we focus here on 
the decision to admit refugees in the first place, rather than what factors lead to relatively many or 
few refugees coming into a country. To empirically evaluate the arguments made in previous 
literature, we test the following hypothesis:  
H1: All else being equal, states accept greater numbers of refugees from rivals than from non-
rival states.  
Rivalry Type and Refugees  
We argue that previous explanations of why rivals accept refugees from their opponent are 
flawed. States may be rivals for several different reasons, as we discuss below, and the issue that 
rivals are disputing (different rivalry types) will have an effect on their decision to grant refugee 
status to individuals fleeing the opponent’s regime. In order to disaggregate rivalry type, we 
employ the typology developed by Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007) and Thompson and 
Dreyer (2012). The authors argue that rivalries can be divided into three types according to the 
issues that motivate it: spatial rivalries, in which states contend over the exclusive control of 
territory; positional rivalries, in which states are seeking to gain influence or prestige within the 
regional or international system; and, as its name implies, ideological rivalries, in which states 
“contest the relative virtues of different belief systems in relation to political, economic, societal, 
or religious phenomena” (Thompson and Dreyer 2012: 21). Each of these rivalry types is 
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associated with unique strategic decisions made with that state’s rival in mind, and therefore 
present divergent incentives to grant admission to the rival’s refugees.  
Ideological Rivalry  
Ideological rivals claim that their system of government is ideologically or morally 
superior to their rival’s system of government, religious orientation, cultural values, or economic 
system, and they consider each other an enemy because their regime types/ideologies are 
incompatible and competitive.5 The repeated disputes between Guatemala and El Salvador in the 
19th and 20th century, in which each state repeatedly tried to influence the regime type of the other 
along Liberal vs. Conservative lines, is an example of ideological rivalry.6 Probably the most well-
known ideological rivalry was between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War. Other examples of ideological rivalries include Burkina Faso—Mali, Guyana—Venezuela, 
and Zimbabwe—Mozambique. 
Rivalries can occur across multiple dimensions. State who are ideological rivals may also 
be spatial or positional rivals. Some rivalries even occur across all 3 dimensions.7 This raises the 
question of whether states who are only ideological rivals behave differently than states who are 
ideological rivals as well as positional and/or spatial rivals. We argue that they will not—the 
incentives to accept or reject refugees is a function of whether or not the states are ideological 
enemies, and is not tied to whether any other issues are present. The reason for this is 
straightforward and much discussed in previous scholarship on issue salience and strategic rivalry. 
Put briefly, some issues are more salient than others. The most salient issues are symbolic issues 
 
5 See appendix B for a full list of all rivalries in our sample.  
6 Rivalry types are not mutually exclusive. The US and USSR during the Cold War were both ideological and 
positional rivals, as they competed over the morality of their systems of government and over relative global influence.  
7 There are a total of 106 rivalries in our sample. 57 of these dispute a single issue, and 49 dispute at least 2 issues at 
some point in their rivalry. 6 dyads involve a rivalry across all 3 issues. 
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(Hensel, Mitchell, Sowers, and Thyne 2008), and ideological rivalry amounts to a dispute over 
symbolic (intangible) issues. States view symbolic (intangible) issues with higher salience (Diehl 
1992; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981), so when these issues are present, they will take precedence 
in shaping how these rivals interact. 
When states are fighting over ideological issues, the incentives to publicly criticize and 
shame a rival over the malpractice of governance or mistreatment of its own citizens will be 
strongest. In these cases, the states are fighting over the relative merits of their belief systems in 
order to attract new ideological adherents abroad and strengthen ideological support at home. To 
attract new adherents to the state’s ideological persuasion, the state must make their ideology 
appear to be socially, economically, culturally, morally, and/or politically superior to its rival’s. 
To do so, they will attempt to show that their own population is content with the treatment they 
receive at the hands of their government and that they are better off than their competitor’s citizens. 
 The state’s desire to present the image of an appealing domestic climate, relative to its 
competitors, incentivizes it to undermine its competitor’s narrative. One way to do this is for the 
state to provide an alternate narrative by publicly shaming the state’s rival over their human rights 
abuses. Shaming a state for its human rights abuses imposes direct costs on a state, and in most 
cases, shaming imposes few costs on the sender (Haffner-Burton 2005; Richards et al. 2001; 
Blanton and Blanton 2007; Thorn 2006). Aside from human rights shaming, ideological rivals may 
shame each other across numerous other dimensions. Indonesia and Malaysia’s ideological rivalry 
was largely connected to each’s perception that the other was not fulfilling the expectations of 
fraternity that states often share when they share much cultural history, and the states contended 
and shamed each other over this issue (Lowi 2005). In the early years of North and South Korea’s 
ideological rivalry, both states were committing human rights abuses, and the two states actually 
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competed mostly over an economic dimension, with each claiming that their economic system was 
superior (Lee 1995).  
 States, even ideological rivals, would prefer to accept few (if any) refugees. Admitting 
refugees is costly and generally presents few benefits. However, ideological rivalry allows for a 
unique type of benefit to accepting refugees—the ability for states to publicly shame or embarrass 
their opponent by showing that their enemy’s citizens prefer the host state’s system of government. 
Because the system of government is the very issue being disputed in ideological rivalries, and 
because the admission of refugees from the opponent can serve as a very public and highly 
internationalized signal that the host state’s regime is superior, states should be more willing to 
pay the costs of hosting refugees from their ideological rival. An example of this can be seen in 
the East Germany—West Germany ideological rivalry. Even though West Germany did not have 
the high level of state capacity that would be conducive to hosting thousands of refugees, West 
Germany took on extraordinary costs and accepted nearly all refugees from East Germany because 
they wanted to show that they were morally superior to the East (Limbach 2011). As a final 
example, consider the U.S. policy of admitting any Cuban citizen that arrived on U.S. soil as a 
refugee, no matter how many Cubans arrived and how big a strain they out on the U.S.’s economic 
welfare system, while at the same time the U.S. was admitting relatively few Guatemalan and 
Salvadorian refugees. From 1988 to 2002, Cuba, Guatemala, and El Salvador all had asylum-
seekers fleeing their respective countries in large numbers, but the proportion of those from 
Guatemala and El Salvador who were admitted as refugees into the U.S. was quite low, often less 
than 10% and in some years less than 1%. In the same time period, as much as 99% of Cuban 
asylum seekers were granted refugee status in the U.S.  
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 Of course, all of the preceding discussion of ideological rivalries involves voluntary 
refugee admission. Most asylum-seekers acquire refugee status in a neighboring country. 
Signatories to the 1951 Convention on the Status and Protocol of Refugees are obligated to grant 
refugee status to individuals who cross into their country and are determined by the UNHCR to 
have a reasonable fear of persecution and physical security risk (UNHCR 1951). Thus, while all 
refugee admission is voluntary in the sense that many countries have signed the Convention on the 
Status and Protocol of Refugees, much refugee admission is involuntary in the sense that it 
becomes very difficult for states to deny refugee status to asylum-seekers who have crossed into 
their country en masse. Contiguity is therefore an important factor that influences how many 
refugees a given state will take in (Moorthy and Brathwaite 2016; Moore and Shellman 2007), and 
contiguity represents a less voluntary form of refugee acceptance. Geography dictates where most 
refugees reside (UNHCR). However, some states clearly admit refugees for reasons other than 
contiguity and pressure from the international community. We argue that ideological rivalry serves 
as one of those reasons. We account for the less voluntary process of refugee admission in our 
statistical analysis to ensure that we are properly examining what leads states to voluntarily accept 
refugees. 
H2: All else being equal, states will accept higher numbers of refugees from their ideological 
rivals than from non-ideological rivals.   
Positional Rivalry  
States involved in positional rivalries are contending over relative influence within the 
global or regional system (Thompson and Dreyer 2012: 21). Since economic and military power 
are the most important drivers of relative position within the international system (Gilpin 1981), 
states will attempt to impose costs on their rival along these dimensions. The issues under 
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contention will lead the states involved in the rivalry to attempt to impose costs on each other to 
limit their rival’s ability to leverage their power internationally.  
Unlike ideological rivalries, positional rivalries are usually closely tied to the rivals’ 
relative power and prestige. Thus, the actions these states take to enhance their relative position 
will most often be actions that they expect to give them a relative power advantage. Accepting 
refugees is not a power-enhancing strategy, so in this context, positional rivals should not expect 
to improve their position in the rivalry by taking in their opponent’s refugees.  
Some states do attempt to enhance their prestige via methods not directly tied to power. 
For example, Norway has acted as a mediator in international disputes in the past because they 
value their reputation as a regime committed to international cooperation, and mediating 
international disputes has effectively increased their prestige in the international arena. Norway 
and Sweden use their willingness to host refugees from all over the world as a credible signal of 
their humanitarian values, and in lieu of having large militaries and exercising power, they take on 
the costs of refugees to enhance their international reputation.  
However, this strategy of using refugee acceptance to enhance influence and reputation is 
not common, and the Scandinavian countries are not involved in any rivalries. While it is 
theoretically possible that a state could accept refugees from its positional rival in an attempt to 
enhance its relative position in the region for which they are competing, we do not observe any 
clear examples of this actually occurring. Looking at activity between positional rivals, it 
immediately becomes clear that these rivals often use military power, threats, and other coercive 
measures to try and enhance their position over their rival. While some states accept refugees or 
provide unbiased mediation because taking on the costs of these collective action problems 
generally enhances their reputation, rival states should be hesitant to take on costs and expend 
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resources on policies that do not directly impact their opponent, leaving them to carry on their 
rivalry via coercive strategies.  
In this context of competing over relative influence, it is not clear why states should accept 
their rival’s refugees any more readily than they should accept refugees from any other state. The 
refugees will still come with the same costs—economic strains, potentially unwanted demography 
shifts, conflict risks—but the incentives to accept the refugees present in the context of an 
ideological rivalry are not present in a positional rivalry context. While it is true that rivals in 
general are willing to pay high costs to continue their struggle (Bapat 2012), positional rivals tend 
to choose foreign policy decisions that enhance their own relative power. Accepting refugees 
fleeing from a positional rival is disconnected from and would have little or no impact on the issue 
at stake.  
Spatial Rivalry 
Spatial rivals dispute territory, most commonly a land boundary (Thompson and Dreyer 2011). 
Rivals over territory have an incentive to impose costs upon their rival as they try to coerce their 
opponent into conceding the issue. As with positional rivals, we argue that accepting a spatial 
rival’s refugees will not effectively contribute to their ability to win the contested issues.  
Territorial issues are more the most likely issues to lead to war, and states involved in these 
rivalries tend to engage in arms races and other forms of military defense to leverage their claim 
on the disputed territory (Vasquez 2009, 2012). Spatial rivals are therefore likely to focus on 
coercive foreign policies to advance their territorial claim, as opposed to other methods such as 
refugee acceptance. Accepting a spatial rival’s refugees can actually divert resources away from 
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efforts to improve a state’s relative power over its opponent, as hosting refugees requires the state 
to spend some portion of finite resources caring for them.  
Spatial rivals generally do not consider their opponent’s or their own reputation (beyond a 
reputation for willingness to fight) as an important dimension of the dispute. Thus, the incentive 
present in ideological rivalries to accept refugees—maintaining the legitimacy of one’s own claim 
of ideological superiority while undermining the opponent’s—is not present in spatial rivalries.8 
We therefore expect that the incentives for rivals to accept refugees from their opponent are unique 
to ideological rivals.  
Research Design 
Our data comprise all dyads from 1960-2006.9 We focus on directed dyad-years, which is 
necessary to examine the directional flow of refugees—who the senders are and who the receivers 
are. To test our hypotheses, we first account for the presence of structural zeroes in our data.  
 Refugee acceptance is a rare event; in over 95% of the observations there were no refugees 
accepted. Most states, in most years, do not accept refugees from most other states. Further, most 
states in most years do not produce any refugees that any other state could accept. Thus, the zero 
observations in the dependent variable (whether or not a given state accepted refugees in a given 
year) actually represent one of two distinct phenomena: either a state did not accept refugees from 
 
8 Salehyan (2009) demonstrates that contiguous rivals often allow rebel groups fighting within the rival state to set up 
eternal bases, or “safe havens,” in their territory so that the rebels can attack and damage the host state’s rival. While 
it is possible that states allow rebels to come into their territory by not enforcing the border, which could facilitate 
refugees coming into the country, we do not believe this significantly affects the likelihood of refugee acceptance in 
spatial rivalries for two reasons. First, we empirically account for the fact that some states cannot stop refugees from 
neighboring countries from coming into their territory due to a lack of border control capacity. Second, traveling 
across a border does not make one a refugee in these data; asylum seekers must be granted refugee status and approved 
by the host state. Allowing rebels to operate on the border, or even interfering in a neighboring country’s civil war, 
does not obligate a state to host refugees.  
9 This year range is determined by availability of data for all of our variables of interest.  
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a particular sender (0 observed), or there were no refugees to accept from that sender in the first 
place (0 observed). These different types of zeroes must be accounted for to avoid biased 
estimation.  
 The most common way that quantitative refugee scholars have previously accounted for 
this is to use a zero-inflated negative binomial or a Heckman selection model (Moore and Shellman 
2006, 2007; Moorthy and Brathwaite 2016). These approaches account for the structural zeroes by 
identifying the conditions under which refugees may be generated, and then down-weighting 
observations in which a receiving state could not have conceivably accepted refugees from a given 
sending state. After using this procedure to down-weight structural zeroes in the data, these models 
use a separate stage to evaluate the impact that the predictors of interest have on the number of 
refugees admitted. More specifically, these previous approaches have used the first stage of their 
models to reduce the impact that states who experienced no civil violence, conflict, or repression 
have in model results, because states without violence or repression cannot generate conflict 
refugees.  
We follow this approach and employ zero-inflated negative binomial models in our main 
analyses, since we have an overdispersed count dependent variable with structural zeroes in the 
dependent variable.10 This approach requires that we accurately model which factors create refugee 
flows to account for the structural zeroes, and we draw on previous quantitative studies of refugee 
flows to determine these (Moore and Shellman 2006, 2007; Moorthy and Brathwaite 2016; 
Salehyan 2008).  
 
10 Another way to eliminate the structural zeroes is to restrict the sample to dyads in which one state sent refugees in 
a given year. Clark and Nordstrom (2003) argue that approaches that include the structural zeroes in the analysis risk 
bias from unmodeled treatment effects, making a restricted sample a better option. We argue that the zero-inflated is 
the better approach, but we include the method of eliminating structural zeroes in appendix models. Substantive results 
do not change.  
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The zero-inflated binomial model is a two-stage model and is appropriate for accounting 
for the structural zeroes in the first stage while evaluating our hypotheses in the second stage. In 
the first stage, or inflation stage, we include the factors that create refugees—conflict and 
repression. This accounts for the bias that could be present in the data arising from the fact that 
many states will not accept refugees because there are no refugees to accept. The second (count) 
stage of the model evaluates our expectations of the factors that affect the number of refugees 
accepted by a state, and includes our predictors of interest and the control variables that we expect 
to affect refugee admission. Because basic count models assume that no overdispersion is present 
in the dependent variable, and our data show evidence of overdispersion with respect to the 
conditional variance and mean of the count of refugees admitted, the negative binomial adjustment 
is necessary.  
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is the count of refugees11 accepted by a receiver in a given year 
(UNHCR).12 The UNHCR keeps yearly records of the number of refugees, which countries they 
come from, and the countries in which they settle. Broadly called “populations of concern,” the 
UNHCR data comprise 7 categories. Refugees include people who flee in large groups across state 
borders due to legitimate personal security issues resulting from widespread violence, so economic 
migrants and other people who leave their country for non-security reasons are not considered to 
 
11 In separate analyses, we use logistic regression over a more restricted sample and set a threshold of 1,000 refugees 
accepted in a given year as a criterion for the observation to be coded 1. Countries tend to take in many refugees once 
they decide to accept; the mean number of refugees accepted by receivers is just under 4,000 and over 75% of receivers 
accept more than 1,000 refugees. Results do not differ from our main analyses. 
12 The unconditional probability of any state accepting any refugees from a sending state is .064. For ideological rivals, 
the probability of accepting refugees who are fleeing an ideological rival is .352. There are a total of 39 ideological 
rivalry dyads, 23 of which involve refugee admission at some point during the rivalry. During the period that our 
dataset spans (1960-2006) there were 174,423,812 refugees, of these 1,755,192, or 1 percent, were accepted by 
ideological rivals. 
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be refugees. Asylum-seekers, individuals who have sought external protection but have not been 
granted refugee status, are also a separate category. The remaining categories include returned 
refugees (refugees returning to their home state), returned Internally Displaced Persons, stateless 
persons (individuals not considered citizens of any recognized state), and Others of Concern 
(individuals receiving UNHCR assistance but who do not fall into the above categories). We only 
include refugees in our analysis, as this is the only category that includes individuals who have 
crossed state borders and have been confirmed by the receiving state as refugees, providing the 
clearest signal of the accepting state’s policy decision. 
Independent Variables  
If states that have conflicting interests will accept refugees from each other, then rivals, 
who have conflicting interests by definition, should tend to accept each other’s refugees more than 
non-rivals. In model 1, we use Thompson’s Strategic Rivalry data (2001) for a binary indicator of 
rivalry and evaluate H1. States are considered rivals if they view each other as competitors, as 
potential or realized threats, and as enemies (Thompson 2001, pg. 560). Rivalry is coded 1 if the 
states in the dyad are coded as rivals of any type (ideological, positional, or spatial), and 0 
otherwise.  
In model 2, we use Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson’s (2008) strategic rivalry data to 
analyze the types of rivalry and their impact on refugee acceptance. The rivalry variables in model 
2 are ideological, positional, and spatial rivalry, and are all dichotomous indicators. Recall that in 
the baseline rivalry models, we investigate whether tend to accept more refugees from a rival state, 
irrespective of rivalry type. In model 2, we disaggregate rivalry types and test our expectation (H2) 
that the presence of ideological rivalry in particular should make states accept higher numbers of 
refugees. 
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We expect that because ideological rivals are asserting the ideological superiority of their 
own government, they commit themselves to accepting refugees from their rival, lest they 
undermine their claim that their opponent is morally or ideologically bankrupt by refusing to grant 
protection the victims of that regime. Ideological, spatial, and positional rivalry are each coded 1 
for directed dyad years in which the states are engaged in a specific rivalry type, and coded 0 
otherwise.  
Controls 
We include contiguity as a binary indicator, coded 1 when countries have a contiguous 
border, have a border defined by an inland river, or are separated by 12 or fewer miles of water 
(COW Codebook v3.2). Controlling for contiguity accounts for the involuntary nature of refugee 
admission, wherein states are essentially obligated to grant refugee status to those fleeing 
persecution in a neighboring state. We expect that the presence of ideological rivalry will have a 
positive impact on the number of refugees admitted by a state, independent of the effect of 
contiguity.13  
We also include control variables for structural conditions within states that are associated 
with the likelihood of civil violence. Regime type is coded for each country within the directed 
dyads, receiver democracy and sender democracy, taken from the Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) data (Coppedge et al. 2017). The authors code a continuous measure of democracy, ranging 
from 0 to 1, that factors in freedom of expression, freedom of association, fair elections, an elected 
executive, and the extent of suffrage in a given country to create their variable polyarchy, which 
 
13 We also estimate models in which we interact contiguity with ideological rivalry, but we find no meaningful 
interactive effect. Separately, we exclude contiguous dyads and estimate our models across only non-contiguous 
dyads, and our substantive results remain unaffected.  
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we rename democracy for ease of interpretation. Values closer to 1 indicate higher levels of 
democracy.14  
We include natural logs of GDP per capita and population. GDP has been consistently 
shown to be negatively associated with civil conflict, and population is regularly positively 
associated with civil conflict (Hill and Jones 2014). Data for GDP and population is taken from 
World Bank data.  
We include variables for civil and interstate conflict to capture the effect of ongoing 
conflicts in both sending and receiving states: sender civil conflict, sender interstate conflict, 
receiver civil conflict, and receiver international conflict. Refugees flee their homes due to civil 
and international conflicts placing them in immediate danger. States are more likely to be a sending 
state (refugees coming from that state) when they are experiencing conflict, making potential 
receiving states more likely to receive refugees when a conflict is occurring in the sending state. 
In other words, the likelihood that a state sends refugees increases when that state is experiencing 
conflict, and the likelihood that a potential receiving state actually takes in refugees increases when 
the sending state is experiencing conflict. Indicators for international and civil conflict presence is 
taken from the UCDP dyadic dataset (Harbom, Themner, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; 
Themner and Wallensteen 2011). 
The presence of civil conflict means that at least one rebel group is involved in a campaign 
of mutual violence against the government, but refugees may also flee because of repressive 
conditions in their country, or because of mass violence against civilians committed by the 
 
14 In alternate model specifications, we use Alvarez et al.’s (1996) ACLP indicator for democracy, recoded and 
extended by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010); a dichotomous measure of democracy created by transforming 
the Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2006) data’s polity score for a given country, in which a democracy score of 6 or 
greater is coded as 1 for democracy and 0 otherwise; and the V-Dem measure of judicial constraints (Coppedge et al. 
2017). Results do not change with alternate measures of democracy.  
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government or rebel groups. We use the CIRI Human Rights Data Project measures of torture, 
extrajudicial killing, political imprisonments, and disappearances in each country (Cingranelli, 
Richards, and Clay 2014), as well as a binary indicator for the presence of genocide in each country 
(Farris 2014) to capture the presence of large-scale violence against civilians in a given country.  
We include a dummy variable for post-cold war to insure that our posited mechanisms are 
not simply a function of the Cold War environment. To capture the effect that former colonial ties 
(Hensel 2014) or being a signatory to the UNHCR 1951 Refugee Convention (UNHCR) may have 
on refugee acceptance, we include variables for colony and signatory, respectively. We also 
include a binary indicator for whether the countries share transnational ethnic kin (TEK), coded 1 
if any ethnic group exists in both of the countries in the dyad, and taken from Ruegger and Bohnet 
(2015). If members of an ethnic group that already exists in the state’s borders are fleeing a 
neighboring state, a state may be more willing to accept higher numbers of those refugees because 
the refugees are less likely to meaningfully alter existing demographics, or because members of 
the ethnic group that already reside in the country may become angry if the state refuses to protect 
their ethnic kin. Finally, to account for the fact that having multiple rivalry types may impact state 
behavior on refugee admission, we include a variable for multiple rivalries, coded 1 if the dyad is 
a rivalry dyad and the state are disputing multiple issues (some combination of ideological rivalry, 
spatial rivalry, and positional rivalry).  
Statistical Analysis  
Table 1 displays the results of models 1 and 2, which test H1 and H2, respectively. Model 1 is 
consistent with previous arguments about states accepting refugees from antagonistic states. We 
find that states accept significantly more refugees into their homeland when the refugees are 
fleeing a rival, providing support for H1. This result also makes sense in light of previous empirical 
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findings which show that, in a particular subset of states, rivalry is associated with higher numbers 
of refugees coming into a given state.  
 However, recall that we expect in H2 that the issue rivals are disputing over matters, and 
that looking only at the general presence of rivalry is insufficient to explain why states admit 
refugees. In model 2, we examine the distinct rivalry types and find support for H2.15 When we 
disaggregate rivalry types and consider why the sending and receiving state have become such 
fierce opponents in the first place, we find that the issue does indeed matter: states are more willing 
to accept refugees from their ideological rival than from a non-rival state. This makes sense in 
light of our theoretical mechanism—ideological rivals, who have been condemning their 
opponent’s regime for many years, have been constrained by their own rhetoric and accept 
refugees from their opponent to avoid undermining their own claims of ideological superiority.  
We find no evidence that positional or spatial rivalry has a significant effect on the 
propensity of states accept refugees. This further supports our assertion that it only makes 
theoretical sense for ideological rivals, as opposed to rivals who are disputing territory or relative 
influence, to take on the burden of accepting refugees. While rivalry is significant in model 1, it 
appears that ideological rivalry is driving the results in that model. Here, we find no compelling 
empirical evidence to support claims that rivalry itself, rather than the particular issue being 
disputed, leads states to take on the burden of accepting refugees.16 
The control variables in both models perform as expected and in line with previous 
research, and we briefly discuss them here. First, contiguity is positive and significant, indicating 
 
15 In the appendix, we estimate models in which the US and (separately) all major powers are removed from the sample 
to ensure that results are not being driven by few states involved in ideological rivalries accepting many refugees. Our 
substantive results are unaffected.  
16 In a robustness check, we eliminate all overlapping rivalry types and test our hypotheses only on rivalries that do 
not include multiple issues being disputed. Results are unaffected.  
21  
 
that neighboring states are more likely to exchange refugees than non-neighboring states. This 
makes sense given the “any port in a storm” argument which claims that refugees will tend to flee 
a country bordering their home country. It also makes sense given the fact that the U.N. attempts 
to settle refugees as close to their home country as possible, and neighboring countries face 
pressure from the international community to accept refugees. 
Transnational Ethnic Kin is positive and significant as well, suggesting that states tend to 
take on the burden of hosting refugees who share ethnicity with a group already within the host’s 
borders. Unsurprisingly, a state being a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention (UNHCR) is 
associated with an increased propensity for that state to accept refugees. The state capacity 
variables perform as expected: states with higher populations and higher levels of GDP per capita 
host more refugees, most likely because the refugees will place a relatively lower strain on their 
economies and social welfare systems and will impact their demographics less. Multiple rivalries 
is insignificant, suggesting that there is little reason to believe that disputing multiple issues, rather 
than just one issue, affects state behavior differently. Receiver democracy is positive and 
significant, indicating that democracies are more likely to accept refugees than non-democracies. 
Recall that the inflation stage is designed to evaluate the conditions which give rise to the 
structural zeroes in the data, and here we see results consistent with previous scholarship on the 
generation of refugees. Sender democracy is negative and significant, suggesting that democracies 
tend to not send refugees at all, which is unsurprising given previous research findings that 
democracies are negatively associated with state repression (Hill and Jones 2014; Hill 2016; 
Mason and Mitchell 2016). Sender civil conflict and sender international conflict are positive and 
significant, suggesting that if the sending state in a directed dyad is currently involved in a civil or 
international conflict or war, the receiving state is more likely to accept refugees in that year. This 
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is also intuitive, as conflict often generates refugees. Finally, the controls for state violence perform 
as expected in our models. When sending states have higher levels of violence or political 
repression, a potential receiver is more likely to accept refugees.17 Generally, states with lower 
levels of violence/repression are more likely to accept these refugees. Overall, we find robust 
support for our claims regarding state decisions to accept refugees. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we argue that states’ decisions to accept or not accept refugees does not occur 
without considerable strategic calculation. Accepting refugees carries inherent risk. A large and 
sudden influx of refugees risks a strain on the economy of a state, and the ideological distribution 
of the population may shift if the refugees come from a state that is, on average, more conservative 
in its social policy preferences. Further, refugees may be a mechanism for the well-documented 
diffusion of civil conflict, and states risk an influx of arms and grievances by accepting refugees 
in large numbers. However, as Vasquez (1993) discusses, rivalry drives states to direct their 
foreign policies toward each other in a unique way. States do not make policy cost-benefit 
calculations toward their ideological rivals in the same manner as they do elsewhere; they are more 
aggressive and are willing to take costlier, riskier behavior (Bapat 2012). Deciding to accept 
refugees is one example of ideological rivals engaging in this type of behavior.  
We contribute to both the rivalry and the refugee literature by demonstrating that interstate 
relations play a role in whether or not a state will choose to admit refugees into its borders. States 
do not simply decide whether or not to accept refugees; they decide whether or not to accept 
 
17 The CIRI indicators for repression and violence (killing, political imprisonments, torture, and disappearances) are 
ordinal and coded 0-2, with 0 being higher levels of repression. Thus, negative coefficients actually mean higher levels 
of repression.  
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refugees from a particular sending state. To our knowledge, we put forward one of the first 
quantitative assessments with refugee admission as the variable of interest, and we go further in 
our investigation of rivalrous relationships by explaining which rivalry contexts have the most 
explanatory power on refugee acceptance. When states are engaged in an ideological rivalry, they 
have likely been condemning their rival’s domestic policies, signaling to their own domestic 
population and to the world that their regime is superior. When the state’s ideological enemy 
begins to produce refugees, it presents an opportunity for the potential host to send a highly visible 
and credible signal that people from the sending state would rather live under the host’s system of 
government or political/social culture, which is a powerful signal since the superiority of the 
opponents’ government and/or cultural systems is the very thing being disputed.  
Besides helping to fill in the surprisingly underexplored quantitative international relations 
literature on refugees, our study has direct policy implications. Refugees pose a difficult collective 
action problem, as most states have few incentives to take on the costs of hosting them. We suggest 
that when refugees begin to flee, ideological rivals have a role to play. If the refugees are fleeing 
from a country that is engaged in an ideological rivalry, the UNHCR and other concerned actors 
may have a relatively easy task in finding a home for them. States that have been the biggest critics 
of the sending state’s regime could possibly be leaned on to put their money where their mouth is 
and provide shelter for the victims of the opponent’s regime. This is why the United States 
admitted hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Communist regimes during the Cold War, and, 
in the case of Cuban refugees, even awarded them citizenship.  
Our findings have the potential to help design a more efficient regime for the admission 
and hosting of refugees. By identifying a condition that leads states to be more willing to host 
refugees, the international community may have more success lobbying countries to reduce the 
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unevenly-distributed burden of hosting refugees that is taken on by states neighboring conflict 
zones. In essence, admitting refugees from an ideological rival can act as a selective incentive to 
overcome the free rider problem of hosting refugees; because ideological rivals dispute the 
superiority of their cultures, systems of government, etc., admitting the enemy’s refugees signals 
that even the enemy’s own citizens would rather live in the host state, reinforcing the state’s claim 
of superiority.  
Furthermore, our findings raise a question that we explore in future research: do host states 
treat the refugees that fled from the host’s ideological rival better, on average? Refugees do not 
always flee into a safe host, but our findings suggest that ideological rivals, beyond being willing 
to host refugees from their enemy, should avoid repressing those refugees for much the same 
reason as admitting them in the first place.  
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Table 1: Effect of Rivalry (Type) on Refugee Acceptance, ZINB Regression 
 Rivals Rivalry Type 
Count Stage   
Rivalry 4.398***  
 (0.867)  
Ideological Rivalry  5.221*** 
  (0.800) 
Positional Rivalry  0.961 
  (1.282) 
Spatial Rivalry  -0.734 
  (0.878) 
Contiguity 4.640*** 5.155*** 
 (0.426) (0.456) 
Multiple Rivalries -3.433* -2.909 
 (1.363) (1.593) 
Receiver Democracy 2.036** 2.048** 
 (0.645) (0.647) 
Receiver Civil Conflict 0.317 0.393* 
 (0.195) (0.191) 
Receiver International Conflict 1.464*** 1.466** 
 (0.443) (0.449) 
Sender Population (log) -0.058 -0.050 
 (0.100) (0.100) 
Receiver Population (log) 0.723*** 0.731*** 
 (0.104) (0.103) 
Sender GDP per cap (log) -1.514*** -1.511*** 
 (0.100) (0.100) 
Receiver GDP per cap (log) 0.875*** 0.873*** 
 (0.078) (0.079) 
Post Cold War -0.273 -0.271 
 (0.393) (0.388) 
Receiver Torture 0.124 0.113 
 (0.142) (0.144) 
Receiver Killing 0.004 0.023 
 (0.151) (0.152) 
Receiver Disappearances 0.007 0.013 
 (0.138) (0.137) 
Receiver Political Imprisonments -0.294* -0.306* 
 (0.128) (0.128) 
TEK 4.492*** 4.523*** 
 (0.708) (0.716) 
Receiver UNHCR Signatory 1.675*** 1.716*** 
 (0.317) (0.318) 
Sender Former Colony -3.751*** -3.811*** 
 (0.648) (0.670) 
Constant -6.388* -6.720* 
 (2.767) (2.768) 
Inflation Stage   
Sender Democracy -1.813*** -1.799*** 
 (0.331) (0.331) 
Sender Civil Conflict -0.504** -0.506** 
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 (0.176) (0.176) 
Sender International Conflict -0.937*** -0.937*** 
 (0.253) (0.253) 
Sender Genocide 0.652* 0.651* 
 (0.264) (0.264) 
Sender Torture 1.308*** 1.306*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
Sender Killing 0.516*** 0.515*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
Sender Disappearances 0.230* 0.229* 
 (0.094) (0.094) 
Sender Political Imprisonments 0.530*** 0.529*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) 
Constant -2.472*** -2.469*** 
 (0.206) (0.206) 
   
ln(alpha) 3.842*** 3.840*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) 
Observations 437607 437607 
AIC 595808.8 595771.9 
Standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, two-tailed test. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Stan. Dev.  Minimum Maximum 
Number 
Refugees 
Accepted 
245.581 15122.910 0 3,272,290 
Rivals .004 .064 0 1 
Ideological 
Rivals 
.001 .038 0 1 
Positional 
Rivals 
.002 .047 0 1 
Spatial Rivals .003 .051 0 1 
Contiguity  .020 .142 0 1 
Multiple 
Rivalries 
.002 .046 0 1 
Democracy .434 .289 .015 .943 
Civil Conflict  .127 .333 0 1 
International 
Conflict  
.041 .199 0 1 
Torture .798 .749 0 2 
Extrajudicial 
Killing  
1.330 .771 0 2 
Disappearances 1.662 .643 0 2 
Political 
Imprisonments 
1.121 .850 0 2 
Sender 
Genocide 
.034 .180 0 1 
TEK .048 .214 0 1 
UNHCR 
Signatory  
.569 .495 0 1 
Sender Former 
Colony 
.001 .029 0 1 
Post-Cold War .496 .500 0 1 
Population 
(log) 
15.484 2.011 9.150 20.994 
GDP/pc (log) 7.304 1.616 3.625 11.818 
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